Impacts of land use, population, and climate change on global food security by Molotoks, Amy et al.
This is a repository copy of Impacts of land use, population, and climate change on global 
food security.




Molotoks, Amy, Smith, Pete and Dawson, Terence P. (2020) Impacts of land use, 






This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Food Energy Secur. 2021;10:e261.    |  1 of 20
https://doi.org/10.1002/fes3.261
wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/fes3
DOI: 10.1002/fes3.261  
O R I G I N A L  R E S E A R C H




 |   Pete Smith2 |   Terence P. Dawson3
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original 
work is properly cited.
© 2020 The Authors. Food and Energy Security published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
1Department of Environment and 
Geography, Stockholm Environment 
Institute York, University of York, York, 
UK
2Institute of Biological and Environmental 
Sciences, University of Aberdeen, 
Aberdeen, UK
3Department of Geography, King's College 
London, London, UK
Correspondence
Amy Molotoks, Department of 
Environment and Geography, Stockholm 
Environment Institute York, University of 
York, York YO10 5NG, UK.
Email: amy.molotoks@york.ac.uk
Abstract
In recent years, global hunger has begun to rise, returning to levels from a decade 
ago. Climate change is a key driver behind these recent rises and is one of the lead-
ing causes of severe food crises. When coupled with population growth and land 
use change, future climate variability is predicted to have profound impacts on 
global food security. We examine future global impacts of climate variability, popu-
lation, and land use change on food security to 2050, using the modeling frame-
work FEEDME (Food Estimation and Export for Diet and Malnutrition Evaluation). 
The model uses national food balance sheets (FBS) to determine mean per capita 
calories, hence incorporating an assumption that minimum dietary energy require-
ments (MDER) remain constant. To account for climate variability, we use two 
Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios from the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), alongside three Shared Socio-economic Pathway 
(SSP) scenarios incorporating land use and population change within the model. Our 
results indicate that SSP scenarios have a larger impact on future food insecurity, in 
particular because of projected changes in population. Countries with a projected 
decrease in population growth had higher food security, while those with a projected 
rapid population growth tended to experience the worst impacts on food security. 
Although climate change scenarios had an effect on future crop yields, population 
growth appeared to be the dominant driver of change in undernourishment preva-
lence. Therefore, strategies to mitigate the consequences of projected population 
growth, including improved maternal health care, increasing equality of access to 
food at the national level, closing the yield gap, and changes in trade patterns, are 
essential to ensuring severe future food insecurity is avoided.
K E Y W O R D S
FEEDME model, food security, undernourishment
[The copyright line for this article was 
changed on 8 January 2021, after original 
online publication]  
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Global hunger is currently rising and has been since 2014, 
after years of decline (FAO et  al.,  2018). The proportion 
of undernourished people worldwide increased to 10.6% in 
2015 and then to 11% in 2016 (UN, 2018). According to the 
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of the United 
Nations, the number of undernourished people in the world 
reached an estimated 821 million in 2017, which is around 
one in nine people (FAO et al., 2018). This rise in food inse-
curity indicates a significant risk of falling short of achieving 
the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target of hunger 
eradication by 2030 (FAO et al., 2018).
Food security was defined at the 1996 World Food summit 
as “existing when all people, at all times, have physical and 
economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that 
meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy life” (FAO, 2008). It is determined by four main 
factors: (1) availability, for example, access to productive land 
and agricultural production, (2) access, physically, socially and 
economically, (3) utilization, for example, food preparation and 
diversity of diet, and (4) stability across the first three dimen-
sions. Major disasters, for example, would affect the stability of 
a countries’ food security, of which 80% of those internationally 
reported are climate related (FAO et al., 2018).
Climate variability and extremes are a significant driver 
of increases in global hunger (FAO et al., 2018). The chang-
ing nature of climate variability and extremes negatively af-
fects all four dimensions of food security (FAO et al., 2018). 
It has direct impacts on crop production, with an estimated 
3.1%–7.4% reduction in global yields of major crops for 
each degree-Celsius increase in global mean temperature 
(Zhao et al., 2017). Using a 2005 baseline, projections fore-
cast an increase in global crop demand of 100%–110% by 
2050 (Tilman et al., 2011), which is propelled by population 
growth and greater per capita income (Godfray et al., 2010). 
Even more recent projections which use 2014 as a baseline 
estimate an increase in production of 25%–70% is necessary 
for meeting crop demand in 2050 (Hunter et al., 2017).
The world's population is currently growing by approxi-
mately 1.1% per year, and if current trends continue, accord-
ing to the medium-variant projection, the world's population is 
projected to reach 9.7 billion by 2050 (UN, 2019). Despite in-
herent uncertainty in population projections, with recent years 
overestimating population growth (Keilman, 1998), it is with 
95% certainty that by 2050, the global population will stand 
between 9.4 and 10.1 billion (UN, 2019). More than half of this 
anticipated growth is expected to occur in sub-Saharan Africa, 
adding 1.05 billion people between 2019 and 2050 (UN, 2019). 
Two-thirds of the projected growth is projected to be attributed 
to current age structures, hence even if fertility levels declined, 
population growth would continue (UN, 2019). The majority 
of the increase in global population, however, can be attributed 
to a small number of countries. From 2019–2050, more than 
half of the world's population growth will be concentrated in 
just nine countries: India, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, the United States of 
America, Egypt, and Indonesia (UN, 2019).
The majority of these are low-income countries (LIC); 
hence, it is expected that there will be limited resources and 
access to technology to sustainably produce more food for 
growing populations. Although investment of agricultural 
GDP in technology is increasing worldwide, it is uneven, 
with spending equivalent to 3.25% in high-income countries 
(HIC). For LICs, where the vast majority of increased food 
demand will occur and the greatest impact could be seen 
from closing the yield gap, only 0.52% of agricultural GDP 
is spent on investing in research and development, despite 
strong evidence that this investment effectively alleviates 
poverty (Fuglie et al., 2020; Tilman et al., 2002). A lack of 
investment in technology coupled with increased fluctuations 
in crop yields due to climate change could lead to an accel-
erated cropland expansion into unsuitable lands, including 
conversion of natural forests (Lambin & Meyfroidt,  2011). 
Matching the rapidly increasing and changing demand for 
food, in ways which are environmentally and socially sus-
tainable, while making sure no one goes hungry is one of the 
worlds’ biggest challenges (Godfray et al., 2010). However, 
future projections of population, land use, and crop yield 
changes vary with different socioeconomic and climate con-
ditions. Therefore, in this study we aim to compare future 
effects on global food security across a range of scenarios, 
building on the Dawson et al. (2016) study, which examined 
the impacts of changes in crop yields on global food security 
under the SRES A1B climate scenario.
In this study, we use two representative concentration 
pathways (RCPs) to demonstrate climate change impacts 
on future crop yields. We also examine three Shared Socio-
economic Pathways (SSPs) projecting different population 
change and cropland expansion scenarios to 2050. By alter-
ing the parameters of the Food Estimation and Export for 
Diet and Malnutrition Evaluation (FEEDME) model accord-
ing to these scenarios, we have three main objectives: firstly 
to compare impacts of different scenarios on national food se-
curity; secondly to indicate the key drivers of undernourish-
ment prevalence from making these comparisons; and thirdly 
to demonstrate which areas on a global scale are most likely 
to be at risk of undernourishment in the future across all sce-
narios considered. This is in order to direct climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, and food security strategies.
2 |  METHODS
The FEEDME model as described in Dawson et al. (2016) was 
used to analyze undernourishment prevalence at a national 
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level. This modeling framework, as detailed in Figure 1, uses 
the dietary energy provision-based methodology adopted by 
the FAO (FAO, 2004) to allow for comparability between 
current, historical, and future levels of food insecurity at a 
national or global scale. This approach has become the stand-
ard for rapid assessment of undernourishment as an indica-
tor of food security. The FAO indicator of the Prevalence 
of Undernourishment (PoU) is defined as “the percentage of 
a population whose food intake in terms of dietary energy 
in kilocalories is insufficient to meet requirements on a con-
tinual basis” (Hall et al., 2017). It is an internationally rec-
ognized indicator routinely used by international agencies, 
governments, and NGOs alike since 1998 and is evaluated 
with reference to a mean daily calorie threshold. This is de-
scribed as a Minimum Dietary Energy Requirement (MDER) 
as established by nutritionists, and a probability distribution 
of habitual Dietary Energy Consumption of a representative 
individual in a population. Each country has a mean per cap-
ita MDER threshold based upon their demographic structure; 
therefore, the proportion of the population with food con-
sumption below the MDER is considered by the model as 
undernourished.
The relatively simple parametric methodology used to 
calculate PoU for a population is able to account for two of 
the important aspects of food insecurity, specifically; avail-
ability, using mean calories (kcal person−1 year−1) estimated 
from Food Balance Sheets (FBS), and differential  access, 
estimated from a measure of the inequality of access to 
food across a population. The latter, drawing upon exten-
sive household surveys, uses a two-parameter lognormal or 
three-parameter skew-normal and skew-lognormal curves 
to define a stylized relationship between household income 
and food consumption whose shape is characterized by a 
coefficient of variation (CV) as a parameter accounting for 
inequality in food consumption and a skewness (SK) param-
eter accounting for asymmetry in the distribution. Further 
information on the equations and assumptions used to derive 
CV and SK directly from available household survey data are 
described in Wanner et al. (2014). Likewise indirect methods 
through using macroeconomic relationships between CV and 
national-level Gini coefficient of income inequality (Gini), 
GDP, and infant mortality data are also described (Wanner 
et al., 2014).
FEEDME integrates the FAO methodology with coun-
try level statistics from the FAOSTAT database for use in 
future scenarios of climate, population, and socioeconomic 
changes. Within this database, food balance sheets (FBS) 
are compiled for each country annually, which are assumed 
to be the best available data despite their limitations for 
LICs. They specify estimates of national-level food produc-
tion, imports, exports, and food availability on a per capita 
basis as well as in calorific values for all food commod-
ities. The FBS for 175 countries were downloaded from 
the FAOSTAT website and subsequently reformatted to 
standardize spreadsheets for automatic manipulation of the 
data using the FEEDME model. Specifically, three aspects 
were altered manually: (a) changes in crop yields, and hence 
crop production, as a result of climate change, (b) land use 
change in terms of total area under cultivation, and (c) pop-
ulation changes under each scenario.
The first aspect manually altered was changes in crop 
yields under climate scenarios. This analysis covers two 
Representative Concentration Pathways which are the lat-
est atmospheric concentration scenarios adopted by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for 
its fifth Assessment Report in 2014. We use RCP2.6 and 
RCP6.0 which were elected for their representativeness at the 
end of the 21st century (van Vuuren et al., 2011; Van Meijl 
F I G U R E  1  Systematic diagram of 
FEEDME model (Dawson et al., 2016)
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et al., 2017). RCP2.6 represents the range of lowest green-
house gas emissions, requiring strict climate policies to limit 
emissions and is also the lowest in terms of energy intensity 
(van Vuuren et  al.,  2011). RCP6.0 has a heavy reliance on 
fossil fuels, while RCP2.6 sees declines in use of oil as a re-
sult of depletion and climate policy (van Vuuren et al., 2011). 
Climate change effects on crop yields from these two scenar-
ios were incorporated into the FEEDME model using region-
ally aggregated annual growth rates for three reference crops: 
wheat, maize, and soybean (Van Meijl et al., 2017). The rel-
ative change in production from the baseline year (2000) for 
the three reference crops were mapped to a wider list of food 
items (Table 1) in the countries FBS as outlined in Dawson 
et al. (2016).
The three reference crops were chosen due to their global 
significance, as well as reasons of data availability and mod-
eling complexity. Although this approach has limitations, the 
individual crops chosen represent three large crop categories. 
All crops follow a C3 or C4 photosynthetic pathway; hence, 
it is assumed that changes in productivity will be similar for 
crops categorized into monocot C3 (wheat), monocot C4 
(maize), or dicot C3 (soy) when grown in optimal conditions 
with no constraint on resources. It is important to note there 
are a range of factors which have not been considered which 
Group
Reference 
Crop FBS commodities: summary
FBS commodities: 
individual
C4 (cf maize) Maize crop 
yield data





C3 (cf wheat) Wheat crop 
yield data
Cereals, Alcoholic Beverages Wheat, rice, barley, 
rye, oats, other 
cereals, beer
C3 (cf soy) Soybean crop 
yield data





rape and mustard 
seed, cottonseed, 
sesame seed, other 
oil crops, soybean 
oil, groundnut oil, 
sunflower seed oil, 
rape and mustard 
oil, cottonseed oil, 
sesame seed oil
Other No change Starchy roots, sugar crops, 
tree nuts, vegetables, 
fruits stimulants, spices, 
miscellaneous
Sugar beet, honey, 
coconuts, palm 
kernels, olives, palm 
kernel oil, palm oil, 
coconut oil, olive 






Meat, offals—edible, animal 













(C4) or beet 
(no change) 
above
T A B L E  1  Assignment of FBS 
commodities to reference crops for 
projection of production changes
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would produce variation between different crops and are out-
side the scope of this study. However for some, for example, 
differences due to light-use efficiency (LUE) of individual 
crops (the ratio of net primary productivity to absorbed pho-
tosynthetically active radiation) the difference is minimal 
(1%–2%). The chosen reference crops vary in their LUE from 
high to low (Slattery & Ort,  2015), hence can represent a 
wide range of crops, but the differences in LUE have a much 
smaller effect on productivity in comparison with climate 
change effects incorporated within the crop model data used 
for this study.
For each region, we calculated total change in crop yields 
over the 50 year period 2000–2050 based on estimated annual 
growth rates for each of the reference crops from biophysical 
crop modeling data produced under AgMIP (Agricultural 
Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project, Van Meijl 
et al., 2017), which were regionally aggregated into thirteen 
coherent spatial regions. This was used to revise the crop 
production values in the FBS for each country based on the 
region within which it was located.
Three Shared Socio-economic Pathways; SSP1, 2, and 
3 were also used to provide the model with population and 
land use change projections, which were the other two as-
pects manually altered in the model. The SSP scenarios are 
defined as “reference pathways describing plausible alterna-
tive trends in the evolution of society and ecosystems over a 
century timescale” (O'Neill et al., 2014). SSP1 is the “green-
est” scenario, representing low challenges for mitigation 
and adaptation to climate change. Sustainable development 
proceeds at a high pace, lessening global inequalities, and 
there is rapid technological change toward low carbon en-
ergy sources. SSP2 is an intermediate scenario representing 
moderate challenges and a future where development trends 
follow a “middle of the road” pathway consistent with typical 
patterns observed over the last century. SSP3 represents sig-
nificant challenges for mitigation and adaptation to climate 
change, with slow technological change and a rapidly grow-
ing population. Emissions are unmitigated, there are reduced 
trade flows and, due to a lack of investment in human capital, 
large numbers of people are left vulnerable to climate change 
impacts with low adaptive capacity. (O'Neill et al., 2017). 
This scenario, when coupled with RCP6.0 (RCP6.0 SSP3), is 
what we describe as the scenario with the highest global im-
pact (HGI), while SSP1 with RCP2.6 (RCP2.6 SSP1) is de-
scribed as the scenario with the lowest global impact (LGI).
In this study, we look specifically at change in total area 
of cropland under each SSP scenario, using land use change 
data from the IMAGE 3.0 model. The change in total crop-
land area from 2010–2050 was extracted per country and 
percentage increase calculated over the specified time frame. 
Although country FBS existed for 175 countries as examined 
in Dawson et al. (2016), we examine only 159 here, due to a 
lack of availability of either land use change or population 
data for the excluded countries. These countries were often 
small islands for which the land use change data were not 
available due to the coarseness of the data.
The FEEDME model was run for each of the 159 countries 
both for the baseline period (2000–2002) and for projections 
to the year 2050, using population projections taken from 
each SSP scenario a well as modifying the crop yield and 
land use changes as described above. Although the baseline is 
2000, the FBS were based on the mean of years 2000–2002 to 
reduce effects of any anomalous change in production in any 
one year. Both the total number of people undernourished 
and the undernourishment prevalence (probability of under-
nourishment) were produced as results, yet we present only 
the latter in this study. This is to enable comparison with pre-
vious studies (Dawson et al., 2016; Hall et al., 2017) as well 
as official FAO publications. The model adopts the following 
assumptions:-
1. national-level population demographic structures (age 
and gender) remain the same as the year 2000;
2. income and food inequality Gini coefficients remain the 
same as the year 2000 values;
3. minimum dietary energy requirements (MDER) for a 
country remain constant throughout the 21st century;
4. food trade (imports and exports) are held constant through 
the 21st century for each country;
5. dietary patterns remain constant until 2050.
These assumptions pose a limitation to the model, particu-
larly the assumption of no change to food imports and exports, 
as this leads to a projected increase in undernourishment even 
without climate change effects, due to population growth pro-
jections if the country cannot meet population requirements 
through national production. While the assumption of no 
change in international trade is unrealistic, the results high-
light the potential shortfall in imports which are needed to 
address national food needs. Hence, undernourishment prev-
alence should be interpreted as an indicator of exposure to 
undernourishment in the absence of no adaptation or mitiga-
tion responses. When faced with an increased proportion of 
people who are undernourished, responses often consist of 
increasing national food production or changing international 
food trade agreements, which are difficult to predict.
3 |  RESULTS
Undernourishment for the baseline period 2000–2002 is 
shown in Figure 2 for which the prevalence of undernourish-
ment scale was adopted from the FAO Hunger Map 2015. 
To validate model results, we compare baseline figures pro-
duced by FEEDME for each country to published FAO fig-
ures for the period 2000–2002 (FAO, 2004). This showed 
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that 88% of listed “developing” and “in transition” countries 
were within 5% of FEEDME results, with a Person's corre-
lation coefficient of 0.98. It is worth noting that FAO does 
not differentiate below 2.5% undernourishment prevalence; 
hence, countries with less undernourishment prevalence were 
listed as 2.5%. The vast majority of countries not listed in 
this report in North America and Europe were shown to have 
<2.5% undernourished according to web-based data. When 
these countries are also incorporated, 90% of countries are 
shown to be within 5% difference, with a Pearson's correla-
tion coefficient of 0.99 (Table A1). Minor differences are ex-
plained by FEEDME using population values from the year 
2000, while the FAO results are based on an average of three 
years of undernourishment calculations (2000–2002).
Undernourishment prevalence for RCP2.6 SSP1 and 
RCP6.0 SSP3 are presented (Figures 3 and 4), which incor-
porate land use change. These scenarios are the lowest and 
highest impact on global food security, with RCP2.6 SSP1 
F I G U R E  2  Global map showing the proportion of the population undernourished in each country for the baseline period 2000–2002 as 
simulated by the FEEDME model
F I G U R E  3  Global map showing the proportion of the population undernourished in each country for the lowest global impact (LGI) scenario, 
RCP2.6 SSP1
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having the lowest average prevalence of undernourishment 
globally and RCP6.0 SSP3 having the highest (Figure 5).
In both the lowest and highest global impact scenarios, 
there is a considerable increase in the number of countries 
with a very high prevalence of undernourishment (Figures 2–
4), particularly in the HGI scenario (Figure 4). In this sce-
nario, almost the whole of Latin America, Africa, and parts 
of South East Asia are projected to have a very high preva-
lence of undernourishment (Figure 4). This scenario shows 
significant polarization between HICs and LICs, with most 
countries either being in the top or bottom category of the un-
dernourishment prevalence scale (Figure 4). In contrast, for 
the LGI scenario, although the majority of Africa is still pro-
jected to have a very high prevalence of undernourishment, 
there is considerably more variation across Latin America 
and South East Asia (Figure 3).
Figure  5 shows the global average undernourishment 
prevalence for the baseline as well as each of the scenarios. 
In every scenario, undernourishment prevalence more than 
triples. The baseline shows less than 15% undernourishment, 
while every scenario shows an average of over 50% being 
undernourished. This graph also shows RCP2.6 SSP1 being 
the LGI scenario and RCP6.0 SSP3 being the HGI, with the 
highest prevalence of undernourishment globally, reaching 
almost 60% (Figure 5).
For the vast majority of regions, scenarios all show higher 
mean prevalence of undernourishment than the baseline, with 
the exception of China for which two scenarios show a lower 
undernourishment prevalence (Figure 6). There is variation 
in the patterns shown compared to the scenarios observed on 
the global scale. For example, in LICs such as in sub-Saha-
ran Africa (SSA), Brazil (BRA), and Other South America 
(OSA), the same pattern is shown across the scenarios, with 
RCP2.6 SSP1 being the lowest impact and RCP6.0 SSP3, the 
highest, with impacts increasing across SSPs 1–3 (Figure 6). 
The opposite effect, however, is seen in HICs, for example 
in Europe (EUR), Canada (CAN), and America (USA), with 
the lowest impact seen in RCP6.0 SSP3 and the highest in 
RCP2.6 SSP1 (Figure 6).
4 |  DISCUSSION
Agricultural production is very vulnerable to climate change 
(Osborne et al., 2013). Climate change will affect tempera-
ture, precipitation, and wind speed which all have an effect 
on water availability and other ecosystem services on which 
agriculture relies, hence consequentially on crop yields 
(Calvin et  al.,  2013). Therefore, understanding the impact 
of these changes on food production is essential to ensure 
future global food security (Zhao et al., 2017). There are lim-
ited positive impacts of climate change, for example, longer 
growing season in northerly latitudes. However, the vast ma-
jority of results are homogeneous across major food crops 
and geographical areas, with decreases in yield projected for 
each climate scenario (Wiebe et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2017). 
Adverse impacts of climate change are particularly strong for 
oilseeds (Wiebe et  al., 2015) which could contribute to re-
gional variation in undernourishment prevalence. However, 
for all crops considered in this study, there are only a small 
F I G U R E  4  Global map showing the proportion of the population undernourished in each country for highest global impact (HGI) scenario, 
RCP6.0 SSP3
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handful of regions under each climate scenario which are 
projected to see small increases in annual growth rates from 
2000–2050 (Van Meijl et  al.,  2017). Hence when coupled 
with projected population growth, land use change, that is, 
cropland expansion is not shown to contribute significantly 
to food security. Results from this study show both globally 
(Figure 5), and in the vast majority of regions (Figure 6) and 
countries (Figure A1), there is a higher risk of undernourish-
ment in every scenario examined (Figure 5).
For every scenario, undernourishment prevalence dramat-
ically increases compared with the baseline, which averages 
13% (Figure 5). This is also the case on a regional scale, with 
one exception (Figure 6). For China, two scenarios show a 
lower prevalence of undernourishment: RCP2.6 SSP1 and 
SSP2. The reason for this is both a reduction in population 
in SSP1 and 2, and higher crop yields in RCP2.6 as opposed 
to RCP6.0. Higher crop yields, combined with lower popula-
tion projections, results in lower prevalence of undernourish-
ment. This is despite decreases in total cropland area in these 
scenarios, showing that climate and population changes have 
a larger effect in this region. Previous studies in China also 
show projected decreases in cropland area, yet these climate 
scenarios show climate change to have a largely positive ef-
fect on crop yields, which combined with a plateauing popu-
lation, exert a great impact on future trends of food security 
(Ye et al., 2013).
Although at the global scale the scenario with the largest 
impacts on the prevalence of undernourishment is RCP6.0 
SSP3 (Figure  5), patterns vary considerably between re-
gions (Figure 6). A clear difference is seen between low- and 
F I G U R E  5  Graph showing the mean 
global undernourishment prevalence across 
all scenarios compared to the 2000–2002 
baseline
F I G U R E  6  Graph showing the mean 
undernourishment prevalence across all 
scenarios within each region defined by 
(Van Meijl et al., 2017)
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high-income regions, with sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and 
Latin America showing the same patterns as the global mean 
(Figures 5 and 6). In contrast, high-income regions including 
North America and Europe (EUR) show the opposite pattern, 
where the largest projected prevalence of undernourishment 
is seen in what we describe as the “lowest global impact” sce-
nario (Figure 6). This is also shown when the difference be-
tween the LGI and HGI scenarios are examined. As expected, 
the majority of regions show an increase in percentage of un-
dernourished, however for Australasia, Canada, Europe, and 
the United States of America, there is a decrease (Figure A2).
There are several reasons for this, one being that the ef-
fects on crop yields tend to be less severe at higher latitudes 
which tend to be more developed (Calvin et al., 2013). In one 
study, the largest negative changes in crop yield as a result 
of climate change, with no adaptation occurs in LICs, aver-
aging −9 to −11%, while in the majority of scenarios, pro-
duction in HICs is estimated to increase by up to 11% (Parry 
et al., 2005). In RCP6.0 in particular, the annual growth rates 
of major crops are higher in high-income regions compared 
with tropical areas (Van Meijl et  al.,  2017). Furthermore, 
population growth is projected to be significantly lower for 
HICs (UN, 2019) and even decreases in SSP3 for some coun-
tries such as Canada. Therefore, smaller populations com-
bined with increased crop yields results in undernourishment 
being less prevalent.
For low-income regions however, population growth is 
projected to be the most extreme, with the majority occurring 
in sub-Saharan Africa (UN,  2019). Projections predict that 
Africa's population will double from one to two billion by 
2050 (Foresight,  2011) and rapid population growth is ex-
pected even when assuming a substantial reduction of fertility 
levels (UN, 2019). This is due to”replacement-level fertility” 
which means that even if the number of births per woman 
falls instantly to levels which will stabilize the population 
growth, it will continue to increase in future decades because 
of the young age structure of the population (UN, 2019). The 
concentration of population growth in the poorest countries 
will make it more difficult for governments to combat food 
insecurity and eradicate poverty (UN, 2019).
Across every scenario examined, almost the whole of the 
continent of Africa is in the “Very high” category of under-
nourishment prevalence (Figure A1). There are a couple of 
exceptions across all six scenarios, which are Morocco and 
Tunisia (Figure A1). For SSP1, Libya is also an exception yet 
is still in the “High” category of undernourishment preva-
lence (Figure 2, Figure A1). South Africa however shows the 
most extreme difference between the LGI and HGI scenarios, 
moving from “Moderately low” to “Very high,” an increase 
of over 30% of its population projected to be undernourished. 
For the majority of scenarios, it is not in the highest category 
of undernourishment (Figure  A1), a pattern also shown in 
(Hall et  al.,  2017). Without the impacts of climate change, 
Tunisia and Morocco are also shown as exceptions (Hall 
et al., 2017); however, this study shows more severe impacts 
with the most recent climate change scenarios.
Although not shown in the scale used, the vast majority 
of countries in sub-Saharan Africa project over 95% of the 
population to be undernourished in the HGI and over 70% in 
LGI, excluding only South Africa, Lesotho, and Mauritius. 
Furthermore, when compared to the baseline scenario, there 
is an astonishing average across all scenarios of a 91% in-
crease of the population projected to become undernourished 
by 2050 (Figure  A3). Sub-Saharan Africa not only shows 
the largest increase in undernourishment but also shows 
the smallest difference between LGI and HGI scenarios 
(Figures 3 and 4, Figure A2). Therefore, regardless of the fu-
ture pathway taken, future undernourishment prevalence is 
projected to be severe for this region.
These extreme rates of undernourishment prevalence 
have previously been attributed to an increase in food de-
mand driven by population growth, overshadowing the ef-
fects of climate change (Hall et al., 2017). This is also the 
case in this study, with a larger effect shown between so-
cioeconomic scenarios than climate scenarios. The climate 
scenarios used however do not include the higher emissions 
pathways (RCP 8.5); hence, this finding is potentially a re-
sult of there being similar climate change impacts across 
low to moderate emissions pathways (Wiebe et  al.,  2015). 
This is seen in the example of sub-Saharan Africa, where 
undernourishment prevalence increases by 5% in sub-Saha-
ran Africa between SSP1 and 3, yet only increases by 1% 
between RCP2.6 and 6.0. The impact of land use is even 
smaller, although on a global scale land use change will de-
crease undernourishment prevalence in SSP2 and 3. This 
is largely due to cropland expansion, of which there is less 
in SSP1; hence in this scenario, land use change increases 
undernourishment prevalence. However, there is less than a 
1% difference for SSA when excluded, suggesting that the 
main driver of undernourishment prevalence will be driven 
by population growth.
The largest difference between the LGI and HGI scenarios 
is seen in South America, with an average increase in un-
dernourishment of almost 30%, including Brazil (Figure A2). 
This is also reflected in Figures  2–4. There are no coun-
tries above the “Moderately high” category in the baseline 
scenario (Figure 2); however, several are projected to have 
“Very High” undernourishment prevalence in the LGI sce-
nario, with all countries excluding Guyana being” Very high” 
in the HGI scenario (Figure 4). Therefore, unlike sub-Saha-
ran Africa, future prevalence of undernourishment in South 
America will be highly reliant on the pathway society and 
climate change take. Climate change has a larger impact on 
this region with an average increase of 4% of the population 
becoming undernourished in RCP6.0 compared to RCP2.6. 
However, the biggest difference again is seen between SSP 
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pathways, with a 20% increase in undernourishment preva-
lence between SSP1 and SSP3.
Like with sub-Saharan Africa, if populations continue 
to increase while climate change reduces food production, 
there is likely to be increased undernourishment in the fu-
ture. Although not shown in this study, the country with the 
highest numbers of people projected to be undernourished 
by 2050 as opposed to proportion of the population, across 
every scenario including the baseline, is India. It also has 
some of the highest proportions of its population projected to 
be undernourished (Figure 6) as well as the largest increase 
in proportion of its population undernourished when com-
pared to the baseline scenario (Figure A3), after sub-Saharan 
Africa. Future projections with the lowest population growth 
in LICs have been shown to have the largest reduction in risk 
of hunger (Parry et  al.,  2005). However even within SSP1 
where population growth is the lowest, there is still severe 
undernourishment prevalence (Figure A1).
This indicates that even in best case scenarios like SSP1, 
efforts still result in undernourishment being very high 
purely because of the assumption of no adaptation response. 
Population growth and demographic change are some of the 
biggest challenges for the food system in the next few decades 
(Godfray & Garnett,  2014). Drivers of fertility are a com-
plex topic and it is beyond the scope of this paper to engage 
fully on this topic, but adaptations could include supporting 
continued increase in access to reproductive health care, 
including family planning, especially in LICs (UN,  2019). 
This, as well as improvements to education, can have positive 
effects on reducing fertility while also improving women's 
well-being and livelihoods (Lutz et al., 2008; Nargund, 2009; 
UN, 2019). In LICs, fertility rates tend to be higher; however, 
there is often a reduction in birth rates due to high mater-
nal and perinatal mortality (Nargund, 2009). Therefore, im-
proved health care to reduce mortality rates would, according 
to conventional demographic theory, lead to natural declines 
in fertility (Bongaarts & Casterline, 2012).
As well as a lack of access to contraceptives and gener-
ally lower levels of female education, high fertility rates in 
LICs are often ascribed to the need for a labor force and to 
provide care for parents in old age (Nargund, 2009). Fertility 
preferences however tend to change as a country develops 
and there is a strong inverse correlation between develop-
ment indicators and fertility (Bongaarts & Casterline, 2012). 
Countries with declining population growth rates often see 
benefits in their economy and reductions in poverty (Lutz 
et al., 2008). Increased levels of income and education can 
then potentially in turn lead to fertility rates naturally declin-
ing (Nargund, 2009).
Other mitigation strategies include greater global in-
vestment in appropriate technology improvement as this 
is crucial for reducing environmental impacts of meeting 
future increased crop demand (Tilman et  al.,  2011; Willett 
et al., 2019). This is largely due to strategic, sustainable inten-
sification, which has the potential to elevate yields of existing 
croplands of under-yielding nations and can meet the major-
ity of 2050 global crop demand with limited land clearing 
and GHG emissions (Tilman et al., 2011). Africa in particular 
continues to have large yield gaps (Luan et al., 2018) and see-
ing as this is the region with the highest undernourishment 
prevalence projected, closing the yield gap could make a sig-
nificant difference. However, the maximum attainable yield 
will shift with climate change effects, therefore maintaining 
or increasing productivity to close yield gaps will require 
continued innovation (Godfray et  al.,  2010). Improvements 
in fertilizer and water use efficiency as well as enhancing 
biodiversity and closing nutrient loops are also essential for 
sustainably intensifying food production and closing yield 
gaps (Willett et al., 2019). Substantial increases in public and 
private investment in technology and human resources are 
needed internationally, especially in low-income countries to 
ensure agricultural systems are sustainable, but there are few 
incentives for the private sector (Godfray & Garnett, 2014). 
Hence, it is important to note that although technological 
change could have a significant impact on food security, the 
sociopolitical will to ensure it becomes a reality is essential, 
and our results emphasize how crucial it is that we act quickly 
and effectively to avoid alarming rates of global food insecu-
rity in the future.
There are a number of limitations to this study. In the un-
dernourishment scale used to create the hunger maps, any 
countries with an undernourishment prevalence of over 35% 
were shown in the same category. Thus, variation in under-
nourishment above this threshold is not shown. Yet when the 
scale is altered to “equal intervals,” there is little difference, 
with almost the whole of sub-Saharan Africa still in the high-
est category of undernourishment prevalence. There are also 
limitations of using only three reference crops, which were 
used due to global importance and availability of climate 
change impacts on yields. Despite being representative of a 
large proportion of commodities (Slattery & Ort, 2015), un-
dernourishment prevalence for countries that rely heavily on, 
for example roots and tubers, is likely to be over-estimated. 
Hence, results should be seen as indicative, not absolute. 
Inclusion of other globally important crops such as rice as 
the data become available would also be a significant con-
tribution to future research, although it is important to note 
that production differences for individual crops will show a 
similar order of magnitude of change from climate change 
impacts, due to the similar but limited mechanisms of the 
photosynthetic pathways for all crop types.
Projected changes in meat or fish production are not in-
cluded in the modelled scenarios. While meat and fish are 
important sources of dietary protein, they only contribute a 
relatively small percentage of the total mean energy budget 
per capita (Dawson et al., 2016). In countries that consume 
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higher proportions of meat and fish, for example the USA, 
it still only accounts for 12% and in LICs, this percentage is 
insignificant. Meat products in LICs contribute about 5% to 
per capita calorie consumption and consumption levels have 
changed relatively little over the last 30 years. Livestock pro-
duction is also expected to show very low growth rates under 
future projections, with less than 1.6% annual growth rate on a 
global basis to 2030, with some HICs currently showing a de-
cline in meat production (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012).
Yet it is still important to note that inclusion of climate change 
impacts on livestock could alter the results. For example, the 
quality and quantity of crops used as feed for livestock, as 
well as changes in species composition in grassland systems 
impacting livestock productivity (Thornton et  al.,  2009). 
Hence, it is recommended future research incorporate pasture 
as well as area under cropland within land use change vari-
ables. Although comprising of relatively few calories, these 
food sources are essential for delivering certain micronutri-
ents, for example, zinc, iron, and B14 (Herrero et al., 2013; 
Nelson et  al.,  2018), which global studies often neglect. 
There is an important role therefore for animal source foods 
in achieving nutrition security, as opposed to food security 
(Nelson et al., 2018) and even small levels of consumption 
can substantially reduce undernutrition (Neuman et al., 2003; 
Randolph et  al.,  2007). Although incorporation into global 
modeling is unlikely, it could be possible to model on smaller 
scales, dependent on local data availability. Yet for both in-
clusion of meat production and more reference crops, it is 
highly likely that these changes will be minimal when com-
pared to the extreme rise in projections of undernourishment 
from population growth and continued inequality of access to 
food, which remains a challenge.
Hidden hunger in the form of micronutrient deficiency is of 
particular concern in LICs and in some cases, climate change 
noticeably lowers adequacy ratios (Nelson et al., 2018). This 
is not captured using FAO methodology; hence, it is import-
ant to note that results of this study do not represent a com-
prehensive assessment of food security. In recognizing the 
complexity of monitoring food insecurity, the FAO (2001) 
stated “no direct measure of the state of food insecurity in 
the world will ever be possible” due to the inability to mea-
sure all of the dimensions that constitute food security at 
the level of individuals in a population. This methodology 
does cover two of the important aspects of food insecurity 
specifically availability of food, and differential access, and 
remains the de facto standard for reporting on the outcomes 
of policy interventions. However, a number of assumptions 
and limitations exist relating to both theoretical foundation 
and the methodological principles of a parametric approach. 
The methodology uses few parameters and variables that are 
used to characterize undernourishment. But these have been 
calculated from extensive household survey data and national 
agricultural census data to estimate the distribution of access 
to food across a population and Food Balance Sheets (FBS), 
respectively.
Concerning the FEEDME model, there are three main 
areas of uncertainty: firstly, the use of the curve fit to char-
acterize the variability of distribution of food consumption 
across the whole population; secondly, estimates of the cutoff 
point for intake inadequacy defined on the basis of Minimum 
Dietary Energy Requirements (MDER) referring to the spec-
ification of the basic metabolic rates of individuals, which 
vary with sex, age, and the level of physical activity (Anand 
& Harris, 1992; de Haen et al., 2011); and thirdly, the utility 
and accuracy of FBS, which accounts for food availability, 
as a proxy for food consumption. While there have been crit-
icisms (Naiken, 2007), the lognormal (skewed curve) model 
was initially adopted due its simplicity, requiring only two 
parameters to characterize it, specifically the mean calories 
and a coefficient of variation of dietary energy consump-
tion (kcal  Person−1  Day−1) owing to income inequalities, 
expressed in terms of the well-known Gini coefficient. In 
2012, the more flexible three-parameter skew-normal and 
skew-lognormal curves were adopted to account for more 
varying degrees of asymmetry and where more information 
from household surveys were available. Yet in defense of the 
methodology, the FAO has demonstrated it delivers an appro-
priate inference on the individual state of undernourishment 
through appropriate statistical treatment of available data, 
even if that datum is poor or inadequate (Cafiero, 2014).
The assumption of no changes to trade is also a limitation 
as there would be a projected increase in undernourishment 
based only on population growth (Dawson et al., 2016). This 
assumption produces a few unexpected results. Australia, for 
example, is quite unexpectedly predicted to incur very high 
rates of undernourishment prevalence in the majority of sce-
narios compared to other HICs (Figure A1). It is also pro-
jected to have the largest decrease of undernourishment when 
comparing the LGI to the HGI scenario (Figure A2). This is 
because there is reduction in crop yields as a result of climate 
change, as well as a decrease in cropland and an increase in 
population. Therefore by assuming current trade levels stay 
the same, for example, the country exports two-thirds of all 
grain produced, it is less surprising that Australia is projected 
an increase in undernourishment prevalence. However, the 
results of this study should therefore be treated as the pro-
portion of the population potentially at risk of undernourish-
ment, which trade could at least partly ameliorate.
Countries with high GDP have the capacity to reduce 
their food insecurity in times of crisis by altering their 
trade patterns. For example, Russia in 2010 banned all ex-
ports after drought and wildfires devastated domestic crops 
(Wegren, 2011). However, changes in trade do not improve 
food availability for all (Porkka et al., 2013). An increasing 
dependency on trade may lead to improved food availabil-
ity for example, but mainly in regions with strong economies 
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(Porkka et al., 2013). It is therefore a significant challenge for 
regions such as sub-Saharan Africa which often rely heavily 
on food aid due to the lack the purchasing power needed to 
improve their own food security.
5 |  CONCLUSION
Although climate change is predicted to have a large impact 
on future food security, this paper shows that population 
growth and land use change could have the largest impact. 
This study highlights the severity of potential hunger prev-
alence in the near future, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, 
across all scenarios if rapid mitigation measures are not taken. 
Some of these mitigation measures will be location specific; 
however, increased access to health care, closing the yield 
gap, and reforming trade in LICs are three options that could 
help to reduce the threat of future undernourishment, reverse 
current trends of increasing food insecurity, and help to meet 
the Sustainable Development Goal to eradicate global hunger 
by 2030.
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APPENDIX A
T A B L E  A 1  Undernourishment values for 159 countries generated by the FEEDME model compared to FAO values for baseline period 
2000–2002
Countries FEEDME FAO Difference
Albania 4.92692029 6 −1.07308
Algeria 4.558194472 5 −0.44181
Angola 35.36696135 40 −4.63304
Argentina 2.5 2.5 0
Armenia 29.18609593 34 −4.8139
Australia 2.5 2.5 0
Austria 2.5 2.5 0
Azerbaijan 11.1865929 15 −3.81341
Bahamas 4.719992272 n/a n/a
Bangladesh 27.99151082 30 −2.00849
Barbados 2.5 n/a n/a
Belarus 2.5 2.5 0
Belgium 2.5 2.5 0
Belize 3.196159453 n/a n/a
Benin 11.84184776 15 −3.15815
Bolivia 19.97775643 21 −1.02224
Bosnia and Herzegovina 7.5172141 8 −0.48279
Botswana 26.56453455 32 −5.43547
Brazil 7.08846407 9 −1.91154
Brunei Darussalam 2.702363241 n/a n/a
Bulgaria 8.195257235 11 −2.80474
Burkina Faso 15.41258966 19 −3.58741
Burundi 61.73783628 68 −6.26216
Cambodia 30.07121959 33 −2.92878
Cameroon 21.8979724 25 −3.10203
Canada 2.5 2.5 0
Central African Republic 39.4130695 43 −3.58693
Chad 29.49745539 34 −4.50254
Chile 2.902785759 4 −1.09721
China 10.35675725 11 −0.64324
Colombia 11.20459899 13 −1.7954
Comoros 55.50843873 n/a n/a
Congo 35.33573298 37 −1.66427
Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 65.41766187 71 −5.58234
Costa Rica 3.333620646 4 −0.66638
Côte d'Ivoire 11.21776147 14 −2.78224
Croatia 7.745260943 7 0.745261
Cuba 2.5 3 −0.5
Cyprus 2.5 n/a n/a
Czech Republic 2.5 2.5 0
Denmark 2.5 2.5 0
(Continues)
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Countries FEEDME FAO Difference
Djibouti 30.26559251 n/a n/a
Dominican Republic 13.98294329 25 −11.0171
Ecuador 3.461978333 4 −0.53802
Egypt 2.524953702 3 −0.47505
El Salvador 9.188097375 11 −1.8119
Eritrea 81.99778217 73 8.997782
Estonia 3.647903156 5 −1.3521
Ethiopia 42.92373864 46 −3.07626
Fiji 3.287198284 n/a n/a
Finland 2.5 2.5 0
France 2.5 2.5 0
Gabon 4.714235516 6 −1.28576
Gambia 22.25377495 27 −4.74623
Georgia 16.02238544 27 −10.9776
Germany 2.5 2.5 0
Ghana 9.646012157 13 −3.35399
Greece 2.5 2.5 0
Guatemala 19.42379303 24 −4.57621
Guinea 21.73795078 26 −4.26205
Guinea-Bissau 28.60509262 n/a n/a
Guyana 7.816673672 9 −1.18333
Haiti 41.87429285 47 −5.12571
Honduras 19.19689161 22 −2.80311
Hungary 2.5 2.5 0
Iceland 2.5 2.5 0
India 21.13894213 21 0.138942
Indonesia 5.788677351 6 −0.21132
Iran 3.381848349 4 −0.61815
Ireland 2.5 2.5 0
Israel 2.5 2.5 0
Italy 2.5 2.5 0
Jamaica 8.183848351 10 −1.81615
Japan 5.580568675 2.5 3.080569
Jordan 6.023338221 7 −0.97666
Kazakhstan 10.65960058 13 −2.3404
Kenya 25.20931401 33 −7.79069
Kuwait 4.081377008 5 −0.91862
Kyrgyzstan 4.491279816 6 −1.50872
Laos 18.60873975 22 −3.39126
Latvia 2.871976043 4 −1.12802
Lebanon 2.5 3 −0.5
Lesotho 8.733541219 12 −3.26646
Liberia 39.13000269 46 −6.87
Libya 2.5 n/a n/a
T A B L E  A 1  (Continued)
(Continues)
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Countries FEEDME FAO Difference
Lithuania 2.5 2.5 0
Luxembourg 2.5 2.5 0
Macedonia 7.106513796 11 −3.89349
Madagascar 32.32749937 37 −4.6725
Malawi 29.50697331 33 −3.49303
Malaysia 2.5 2.5 0
Maldives 7.696831716 n/a n/a
Mali 22.72044215 29 −6.27956
Malta 2.5 2.5 0
Mauritania 7.841008233 10 −2.15899
Mauritius 4.835172592 6 −1.16483
Mexico 4.339675161 5 −0.66032
Moldova 9.5000397 11 −1.49996
Mongolia 24.78515327 28 −3.21485
Morocco 5.26899591 7 −1.731
Mozambique 39.82991832 47 −7.17008
Myanmar 5.641057205 6 −0.35894
Namibia 20.16442232 22 −1.83558
Nepal 14.67329809 17 −2.3267
Netherlands 2.5 2.5 0
New Caledonia 8.714828017 n/a n/a
New Zealand 2.5 2.5 0
Nicaragua 23.91910969 27 −3.08089
Niger 32.31433274 34 −1.68567
Nigeria 7.246550297 9 −1.75345
North Korea 31.67641263 36 −4.32359
Norway 2.5 2.5 0
Pakistan 19.81990822 20 −0.18009
Panama 23.9682199 26 −2.03178
Paraguay 12.53283239 14 −1.46717
Peru 10.56307966 13 −2.43692
Philippines 16.90889025 22 −5.09111
Poland 2.5 2.5 0
Portugal 2.5 2.5 0
Romania 2.5 2.5 0
Russia 2.801075768 4 −1.19892
Rwanda 32.11087489 37 −4.88913
Samoa 2.857288265 n/a n/a
Saudi Arabia 3.044817229 3 0.044817
Senegal 19.51257471 24 −4.48743
Sierra Leone 46.15498126 50 −3.84502
Slovakia 4.013357024 5 −0.98664
Slovenia 2.5 2.5 0
Solomon Islands 17.02734588 n/a n/a
T A B L E  A 1  (Continued)
(Continues)
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Countries FEEDME FAO Difference
South Africa 2.5 n/a n/a
South Korea 2.5 2.5 0
Spain 2.5 2.5 0
Sri Lanka 19.94639808 22 −2.0536
Sudan 21.06486007 27 −5.93514
Suriname 8.352073668 11 −2.64793
Swaziland 15.27755375 19 −3.72245
Sweden 2.5 2.5 0
Switzerland 2.5 2.5 0
Syria 2.854235917 4 −1.14576
Tajikistan 56.22063434 61 −4.77937
Tanzania 39.17990627 44 −4.82009
Thailand 20.37395063 20 0.373951
Togo 22.98879711 26 −3.0112
Trinidad and Tobago 9.496585346 12 −2.50341
Tunisia 2.5 2.5 0
Turkey 2.5 3 −0.5
Turkmenistan 7.358152696 9 −1.64185
Uganda 15.39792118 19 −3.60208
Ukraine 2.506402122 3 −0.4936
United Arab Emirates 2.5 2.5 0
United Kingdom 2.5 2.5 0
United States 2.5 2.5 0
Uruguay 2.948816474 4 −1.05118
Uzbekistan 21.31693034 26 −4.68307
Vanuatu 8.651361117 n/a n/a
Venezuela 14.012229 17 −2.98777
Vietnam 16.70161024 19 −2.29839
Zambia 43.71487828 49 −5.28512
Zimbabwe 39.097322 44 −4.90268
T A B L E  A 1  (Continued)
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F I G U R E  A 1  Panel of global maps showing prevalence of undernourishment under each of the six scenarios for RCP2.6 and 6.0, SSPs 1–3, 
including land use and population change but excluding feed and export compensation measures
F I G U R E  A 2  Graph showing average 
percentage change in undernourishment 
prevalence per region between lowest global 
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F I G U R E  A 3  Graph showing average 
difference in undernourishment prevalence 
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